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the opinion provides some clues that a more flexible three-tiered
analysis will be employed in the future,4" it also indicates that the
court prefers to continue its case-by-case analysis of equal protec-
tion challenges, thereby preserving an uncertain status quo.
DAVID GOLD
Exclusionary Rule Does Not Extend to State
Seized Evidence Used in Federal Civil Tax
Proceedings
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court refused to
exclude from admission in a federal civil tax proceeding evidence
seized illegally, but in good faith, by state law enforcement
officers. This note indicates that this decision reflects the Court's
growing disillusionment with the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. It is argued that the opinion fails to recognize potential law
enforcement abuses which may flow from such a limitation of the
rule, and that. the Court did not expound upon the relevance of
the good faith character of the seizures to the holding.
In 1968, pursuant to a search warrant based partly on their
observations of alleged gambling activity, Los Angeles police seized
certain wagering records and $4,940.00 in cash from Max Janis and
arrested him for illegal gambling. As was customary in such cases,
the police informed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of their
observations, the seizures, and the arrest. On the basis of this infor-
would allow the ordinance to pass constitutional muster in furtherance of anyarguably valid
state objective. Such a standard seems to afford too little protection when one considers the
treatment historically afforded first amendment freedoms. On the other hand, a classical
application of the strict scrutiny test, which would almost surely result in declaring the
ordinance unconstitutional, gives too little deference to the traditionally and necessarily
broad zoning power.
48. The analysis employed in Mini Theatres requires minimum governmental concern
for individual rights and a substantial basis, rather than a compelling state interest, to justify
their restriction. Thus the flexible intermediate tier analysis is arguably a mere rational basis
test with "bite." See Gunther, supra note 8, at 21. However, the Supreme Court did not
formally introduce the test. The Court must decide if the flexible test will be added to create
a tertiary formula of equal protection or whether the two-tiered formula will remain intact.
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mation, the IRS assessed a wagering tax on Janis' and levied upon
the seized cash in partial satisfaction of the assessment.2 Subse-
quently, at a hearing on the gambling charges, the municipal court
judge granted a motion to suppress the seized evidence relying on a
case which had been decided after the warrant had been issued.'
Relieved of criminal charges, Janis then initiated civil proceedings
in the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia to obtain a refund of the cash upon which the IRS had levied.
The IRS counterclaimed for the balance of the assessment. It was
stipulated that the sole basis for the assessment was the observation
by the local police together with the seized records and cash. There-
fore, enforcement of the assessment depended upon the determina-
tion of whether the improperly seized evidence was admissible in
civil court. The district court granted Janis' motion to suppress,
quashed the assessment, and granted judgment for Janis. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with-
out opinion. On certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court
held, reversed and remanded: The exclusionary rule shall not be
applied in federal civil tax proceedings to evidence seized illegally,
but in good faith, by state law enforcement officers.' United States
v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
The question of whether evidence illegally obtained by a state
law enforcement officer is admissible in a federal civil proceeding
was one of first impression in the United States Supreme Court. The
rule which requires that courts exclude evidence taken in violation
of an individual's fourth amendment rights5 was born in 1914 in
Weeks v. United States.' Basing its ruling on a general notion that
fourth amendment rights must be enforced, the Supreme Court
excluded evidence improperly obtained by federal agents from use
in federal criminal prosecutions. However it did allow evidence ille-
1. The assessment was made under I.R.C. § 4401. For a detailed discussion of how such
assessments are used by the IRS to enforce criminal laws, see Tarlow, Criminal Defendants
and Abuse of Jeopardy Tax Procedures, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1191 (1975).
2. Authority to levy comes from 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (1970).
3. The case relied on was Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
4. As discussed infra, the exact scope of this holding is not clear. This statement presents
the narrowest possible interpretation.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated .... "
6. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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gally siezed by state officials to be admitted at federal trials.
Recognizing that the Weeks ruling encouraged federal instiga-
tion, planning, and participation in illegal searches by state officers,
the Court initiated the "silver platter doctrine" in Lustig v. United
States.7 This doctrine provided that evidence illegally seized by a
state officer was not admissible in federal court if federal agents
took any part in the search and seizure. Conversely, if evidence was
turned over to federal officials untouched by federal agents (on a
silver platter) it was admissible.8 However, that same year, in Wolf
v. Colorado,' while applying the fourth amendment to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Court declined to require the states to enforce the exclusionary rule
if they could find other ways of safeguarding the constitutional
rights involved. In that opinion the Court noted that the rule might
be a deterrent, but the main purpose of the rule was to assist those
whose rights had been violated. 0 Deterrence gained in importance
when the Court, reaffirming Wolf, questioned whether the exclu-
sionary rule had any deterrent effect at all and showed concern that
it "deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he
has been pursued by another.""
Far reaching extension of the rule began in 1960 with Elkins v.
United States. 12 The Court held that no evidence could be admitted
in federal criminal prosecutions if it had been seized illegally-by
either federal or state agents. Establishing that the main purpose
7. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
8. Id. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion indicated that the exclusionary rule
should be expanded to exclude (from federal criminal trials) any evidence illegally seized by
state or federal officials. In considering the rule's purpose to be general protection of fourth
amendment rights, he reasoned: "Whether state or federal officials did the searching is of no
consequence to the [individual whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated] and it
should make no difference to us." Id. at 81.
9. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10. The reader should note that at this early stage, the Justices who favored restriction
of the rule did see it as a possible deterrent. On the other hand, the dissenters in Wolf, who
favored extension of the rule were convinced that the rule was an effective deterrent and that
deterrence was the prime reason for requiring the states to use the rule. Id. at 40-47. Today
it is the majority who oppose extension who cite deterrence as the only purpose of the rule.
11. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 127, 136 (1954). In a heated dissent to this opinion,
Justice Douglas opined that the exclusionary rule was the only way to keep prosecutors and
law enforcement officers from, violating citizens' rights at will. The debate on the merits of
the exclusionary rule was in full swing.
12. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The Court here adopted Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in
Lustig. See note 8 supra.
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of the rule is deterrence, 3 the Court recognized that there was no
reliable way to test its effectiveness, but based its extension of the
rule on three factors: (1) lack of available alternatives; (2) poten-
tial "subterfuge and evasion" with respect to federal and state coop-
eration in criminal investigations;' 4 and (3) the imperative of judi-
cial integrity which requires that courts not be a party to any illegal
activity. 5
Suspicion of "working arrangements" between cooperating fed-
eral and state agents was a recurrent theme when the Court in Mapp
v. Ohio" finally overruled Wolf and required the states to observe
the exclusionary rule in their own criminal proceedings. Recognizing
that the rule sets many criminals free, the Court nevertheless indi-
cated that without the rule, the fourth amendment was just an
empty promise.
In 1965 the Court extended the exclusionary rule one last time
by applying it to forfeiture proceedings, deemed to be merely quasi-
criminal in nature." By 1969, as the composition of the Supreme
Court began to change, extension of the rule halted. Placing increas-
ing emphasis on deterrence as the justification for the rule, the
Court refused to apply the rule where its deterrent purpose would
not be served.'"
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger in a scalding dissent proposed
that the exclusionary rule had failed, that Congress should find a
workable alternative to it, and that the rule was too broadly applied
and in fact should be limited to serious violations by government
13. "[The rule's] purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the Constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." 364 U.S. at
217.
14. Id. at 222. It is a fine but important distinction here that the Court looked upon the
rule as an incentive to obey the fourth amendment command rather than as merely a punish-
ment for wrongdoing.
15. In a government of laws . . . existence of the government will be imper-
iled if it fails to observe the laws scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omni-present teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its exam-
ple. Crime is contagious .... [Tie declare that the government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal would bring terrible
retribution.
Id. at 223, quoting Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1927).
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
18. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). In this case the Court considered the
question of retroactivity of rules changing admissibility of evidence.
[Vol. 31:721
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agents.'9 He charged that the hope of deterrence by the rule "was
hardly more than a wistful dream."2 This represented the view of
a growing minority.2'
In United States v. Calandra,2" the idea of the exclusionary rule
as an enforcement of the fourth amendment promise of individual
rights disappeared when a majority of the Court held that the sole
purpose for the rule was deterrence. This laid the groundwork for
future decisions (like Janis) where the Court could reason that if
there is no proof of deterrence, the exclusionary rule should not be
applied."
Accordingly, the Court ruled in Michigan v. Tucker2' that the
testimony of a witness need not be excluded where the police learn
his identity by a good faith violation of the fifth amendment. In
such a case, the exclusionary rule loses its force as a deterrent and
should not be applied. Then, in United States v. Peltier,25 the Court
ruled that when a motion to suppress is based on a case decided
after the evidence was seized, the exclusionary rule should not be
observed. The rationale was that neither deterrence nor the impera-
tive of judicial integrity would be served by such a suppression.
Finally, on the same day that Janis was decided, Chief Justice
Burger again called for a complete overruling of the exclusionary
rule. Concurring in Stone v. Powell,"' he reasoned that until the rule
is abolished no practical alternatives will be developed.
When United States v. Janis came to the Supreme Court, it was
met by two justices who favored complete abolition of the
exclusionary rule, Justices Burger and Blackmun,27 four who favored
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971).
20. Id. at 416.
21. Of the current Supreme Court Justices, Justice Blackmun had joined Chief Justice
Burger in his call for complete abolition of the rule. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
22. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
23. Now it was the dissenting minority who believed that deterrence was not the sole
desirable effect of the rule. The dissenters pointed out that there was no mention of deterrence
as a purpose for the rule by the 1914 Court which authored it. They recognized the imperative
of judicial integrity and argued that simply because the rule cannot be proved to be a
successful deterrent is no reason to abandon it. Id. at 355.
24. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Although Tucker deals with the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule, the reasoning is applicable to the fourth amendment.
25. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
26. 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976). For a more complete discussion of Stone v. Powell, see
31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735 (1976).
27. See text accompanying notes 19, 21, & 26 supra.
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limitation of the rule at least in good faith situations, Justices Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, Stewart and White,2" and two steadfast defenders of
the rule, Justices Brennan and Marshall." The majority was con-
vinced that there was no way to test the effectiveness of the rule and
that there was no available alternative to it.
The significance of the Janis decision lies not in its cbnclusion,
but in the grounds upon which it was based and in its uncertain
scope. The Court could easily have decided this case on the same
good faith grounds as Peltier," but clearly it saw the Janis case as
an opportunity to further express its displeasure with the exclusion-
ary rule and to propound a broader limitation of the rule than that
required by the facts of the case before it.
Having recently stated that the principle justification for the
exclusionary rule ig deterrence,' the Janis Court stated that since
there is no accurate way to judge the rule's effectiveness as a
deterrent, it should not be extended. In support of this contention,
the Court cited a variety of studies that failed to prove its deterrent
value. 2 However, the Court neglected to look to law enforcement
experience before the rule was uniformly applied in federal and state
courts. For example, in 1949, states observing the exclusionary rule
warned their law enforcement officers that illegally obtained evi-
dence would not result in the prevention and solution of crime." In
comparison, New York City police (where the rule was not in effect)
were advised by their superiors that illegally obtained evidence
might be admissible.34 Moreover, in Baltimore, an official "Digest
of Laws" informed officers that "evidence illegally obtained may
still be admissible at trial." 35 Although not empirical in nature, this
historical perspective might have helped to enlighten the Court on
the rule's deterrent potential.
Furthermore, the Court notes that its lack of data is similar to
that of the Court in Elkins. But the Elkins opinion also quotes
praises of the rule's deterrent effects by the chief law enforcement
28. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
29. See note 23 supra.
30. In Janis as in Peltier, the seizure of evidence was in good faith and the case which
made the evidence inadmissible was decided after the seizure.
31. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
32. 96 S. Ct. at 3030 n.22.





officer of California."8 These praises were voiced after that state had
observed the rule for two years and were based on a before and after
comparison. The Janis court failed to note this part of the Elkins
reasoning. It also failed to recognize the other two justifications for
the rule in Elkins: the imperative of judicial integrity and the
guarantee of fourth amendment rights.
The Court further reasoned that even if the exclusionary rule
is an effective deterrent, there is no need to extend it to federal civil
tax proceedings since local police are sufficiently "punished" by
exclusion of evidence from state and federal criminal trials. 7 How-
ever, it is not the number of convictions lost which will deter an
illegal search. The lack of incentive to search illegally is the only
true deterrent. The Court assumes that a civil tax case falls outside
a state policeman's "zone of primary interest"38 and that the police-
man's illegal endeavors are entirely frustrated by the rule's effect on
criminal prosecutions. It admittedly bases this reasoning on "its
own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the
various components of the law enforcement system." 9 In so assum-
ing, it ignores the reality of state-IRS cooperation in criminal and
tax investigations.4" The Court also fails to consider the threat of
"working arrangements" or "subterfuge and evasion" between fed-
eral and state agents which led earlier courts to extend the exclu-
sionary rule.4' Nor does the Supreme Court consider its own holding
in Marchetti v. United States,2 that federal wagering taxes are
meant not only to raise revenue but also to assist the efforts of state
36. 364 U.S. at 220.
37. 96 S. Ct. at 3029.
38. Id. at 3034.
39. Id.
40. As pointed out by Justice Stewart in his Janis dissent, the Court ignored the testi-
mony of the arresting officer in Janis, that notification of IRS officials regarding gambling
arrests was the usual practice. 96 S. Ct. at 3036.
41. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
The Court in Mapp clearly feared that "[dienying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating
law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed. . . working arrangements" whereby state
police will seize evidence illegally for the purpose of turning it over to federal authorities. 367
U.S. at 658.
42. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Marchetti noted that it is common for law enforcement agents
to cooperate fully with the IRS when cash is seized pursuant to a gambling arrest. Id. at 48.
In order to do their part, the IRS manual actually instructs officers to "disrupt [crime]
through enforcement of all available tax statutes." Tarlow, supra note 1, at 1192 n.3, quoting
Silver, Terminating the Taxpayer's Taxable Year: How IRS Uses It Against Narcotics
Suspects, 40 J. Tax. 110 (1974).
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and federal authorities to enforce gambling laws. Contrary to its
theory, the Court admits that "police often view trial and conviction
as a lesser aspect of law enforcement."" While it fails to dispose of
this nagging reality, the Court does, however, summarily dispose of
Janis' attempt to use intrasovereign cases to prove that the exclu-
sionary rule had been previously used in civil court. It resorts to its
"common sense" syllogism and reasons that deterrence in an inter-
sovereign situation is far more attenuated than in the intrasovereign
cases, and therefore extension of the rule is pointless.
In sum, the Court reasons that since the deterrent effect of the
rule cannot be measured, and there can be little additional deter-
rence in extending the rule to civil federal tax cases, the cost to
society of the extension of the rule outweighs the negligible potential
benefits.
Although the facts of the instant case include a seizure made
in good faith, the Court does not indicate how much (if any) bearing
good faith had on its decision. The Janis seizures were purely in
good faith-not becoming illegal until after the fact. The Court
gives no inkling of whether the decision applies only to pure good
faith situations, nor does it tell what degree of good faith is neces-
sary to invoke its holding.
Surely, the exact scope of the Janis holding remains unclear.
In stating the issue presented, the Court relates to specific facts of
the case." However, in concluding its opinion the Court says:
We therefore hold that the judicially created exclusionary rule
should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding
of one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement
agent of another sovereign."
This statement does not confine the rule to the facts of the case."
The Court's failure to limit its holding might reflect the desire of
some members of the court to limit severely the use of the exclusion-
ary rule.
United States v. Janis provides a good example of the philoso-
43. 96 S. Ct. at 3029 n.20.
44. Id. at 3029.
45, Id. at 3035.
46. The vague holding does not mention good faith nor does it limit the rule to tax
proceedings. Moreover, it does not indicate what the ruling would be on a question of admissi-
bility of federally seized evidence in state civil court.
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phy of the Burger Court-if it makes good sense, it makes good law.
Since the Court bases its holding primarily on personal assumptions
about human nature (sense rather than fact or stare decisis), the
observer finds himself wondering what cases and data the Court
might have considered. The only comfort to be found is in the fact
that there really was not much new in Janis since the erosion of the
exclusionary rule had begun several years earlier. The limited effect
of this ruling is yet to be seen vis-a-vis law enforcement and the IRS.
However it certainly exemplifies the apparent willingness of the
present Court to tamper with Constitutional safeguards without
giving the potential effect of its ruling a full and fair hearing.
ELLEN CATSMAN FREIDIN
Proprietary Powers: A New Policy Tool for the
States?
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a state
plan under which a bounty was paid to scrap metal processors for
the processing of automobile hulks was an exercise of the state's
proprietary power and not subject to the restrictions of the com-
merce clause. By so holding the Court avoided the need to bal-
ance state interests against the burden placed by the plan upon
interstate commerce. This article discusses the effect of the
Court's decision not to apply the balancing test and argues that
state actions of this type should not be shielded from commerce
clause scrutiny.
Alexandria Scrap Corporation, a Virginia scrap processor,
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a statutory
scheme' through which Maryland, in an effort to protect its environ-
ment, sought to accelerate the rate at which old automobile hulks
were destroyed. By offering a bounty for the destruction of such
hulks, Maryland hoped to bring about an increase in the destruction
rate. Under an amended version of the plan, domestic scrap proces-
sors were allowed to recover the bounty upon filing of proof that the
1. The law, as amended, is set forth at 6 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 5-201 to 210. (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
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